

## CICERO AND ARCHIMEDES' TOMB\*

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In the *Pro Archia* Cicero writes that Alexander, looking upon the tomb of Achilles, cried out, 'O happy youth, who found a Homer to sing your praises!'; words truly spoken, adds Cicero, since without Homer Achilles' tomb would have buried the great man's fame along with his body.<sup>1</sup> And in the *Tusculan Disputations* he writes that the Athenian Themistocles, when asked why he spent his nights wandering about the city, replied that the trophies of Miltiades kept him awake. Juxtaposing one great man and the reminder of another, both anecdotes present vivid and memorable images of rivalry between the ambitious among the living and the high-achievers among the dead.<sup>2</sup> A competition of this kind can be direct, between the man commemorated by a monument and the man viewing it, as are the rivalries of Alexander and Achilles, Themistocles and Miltiades, or it can be indirect, as in the *Pro Archia*, where with a sleight of hand Cicero replaces the rivalry between Achilles and Alexander with the competition between the *Iliad* and Achilles' physical monument. A great mound bears witness to Achilles' death at Troy, but the outburst of the competitive Alexander testifies that a poem is a better memorial than a tomb.<sup>3</sup>

When the viewer of such a monument is himself both a writer and a man of action, as much maker of literary monuments as honoree, the rivalry symbolized by the juxtaposition of the living and the dead becomes twofold. The viewer can compete with the person commemorated by the monument in military, political, or intellectual achievements, while his literary accomplishments can challenge the monument itself. To make matters more complicated, when the man of action and intellect writes about the monument he contemplates, he can represent it as he wishes, including or emphasizing some of its features while omitting or slighting others. And when time and decay have degraded the monument's ability to commemorate clearly the person or event whose memory it was constructed to preserve, its ruins offer the writer a particularly rich opportunity to reconstruct it within a text, and in so doing to fit it into a memory-system of his own design.<sup>4</sup> The author who portrays the monument in writing becomes the *auctor* — the originator and guarantor — of a representation, and that representation can convey a memory quite different from the one preserved by the original.<sup>5</sup>

A case in point is the story Cicero tells in the last book of the *Tusculan Disputations* about his discovery of Archimedes' neglected grave (5.64–6, quoted below). Scholars generally ignore this anecdote, except for biographers who, taking it at face value, refer

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<sup>1</sup> Cicero, *Pro Archia* 10.24: "O fortunate", inquit "adulescens, qui tuae virtutis Homerum praeconem inveneris!" Et vere. Nam, nisi Ilias illa exstitisset, idem tumulus qui corpus eius contexerat nomen etiam obruisset."

<sup>2</sup> Cicero, *TD* 4.44: 'Noctu ambulabat in publico Themistocles cum somnum capere non posset, quaerentibus respondebat Miltiadis tropaeis se e somno suscitari.' On this kind of competition, see also Suetonius, *Div. Iul.* 7.1; Sallust, *Bell. Iug.* 4.5–6; Anth. Lat. 708 (an epigram addressed by Germanicus to Hector's tomb); and Scipio Africanus' words at Livy 28.43.6: 'Maximo cuique id accidere animo certum habeo ut se non cum praesentibus modo sed cum omnis aevi claris viris comparent.'

<sup>3</sup> So is a speech in praise of the humanities, of

course. Famous expressions of this sentiment include Ennius, *Ann.* 404–5: 'reges per regnum status sepulcrae quaerunt / aedificant nomen, summa nituntur opum vi'; and Horace, *Odes* 3.30.1–2: 'exegi monumentum aere perennius regalique situ pyramidum altius', as well as *Odes* 4.8.13ff. For further references see O. Skutsch (ed.), *The Annals of Q. Ennius* (1985), 567–8.

<sup>4</sup> See D. Fowler, 'The ruin of time: monuments and survival at Rome', ch. 9 of *Roman Constructions* (2000), 193–217.

<sup>5</sup> On *auctor*, see R. Heinze, 'Auctoritas', *Hermes* 60 (1925), 348–66; J. Béranger, *Récherches sur l'aspect idéologique du principat* (1953), 114–31; K. Galinsky, *Augustan Culture. An Interpretive Introduction* (1996), 10–41. A good example of author becoming *auctor* is Livy 4.20.5–11, on the *spolia opima* and the restoration of the Temple of Jupiter Feretrius. Note the repetition of *auctor* with different meanings in the Livy passage, and see the discussions of G. Miles, *Livy: Reconstructing Early Rome* (1995), 40–7, and A. Feldherr, *Spectacle and Society in Livy's History* (1998), 75–7.

to it when they discuss Archimedes' death or Cicero's career.<sup>6</sup> The anecdote merits attention on its own account, however, because it brings together several of the dialogue's major themes and in doing so acquires a meaning greater than their sum. What follows will explicate this meaning in three interrelated ways: first, it will examine briefly the structure of the anecdote and the way it fits into its various frameworks — autobiographical, discursive, and intellectual; next, by looking at the anecdote's rhetorical features it will show how Cicero constructs a new textual monument from the fragments of a physical one; finally, delving more deeply into matters of context, it will consider this written monument's symbolic function in the *Tusculan Disputations* as a whole, and its role in two related arguments presented by the dialogue, that the soul is immortal and that virtue is sufficient for living happily. Parts of the last section bolster points made in other discussions of *exempla* in Roman philosophical debate, but by approaching these reminders of past virtues and vices in their most concrete form — that of monuments — I hope to illustrate further the role played by memory and authority in this particular discussion of moral issues.<sup>7</sup> According to Cicero the *Tusculan Disputations* were rhetorical exercises on philosophical topics, and Paul MacKendrick has observed that the use of rhetoric for philosophical ends is 'the heart of Cicero's originality'.<sup>8</sup> Here, at least, Cicero's originality stems from the features of his writing that might be called the most Roman: the personal, the concrete, and the exemplary.

#### I. THE STRUCTURE AND CONTEXT OF THE ANECDOTE

The *Tusculan Disputations* was one of several works of moral philosophy that occupied Cicero in the years 45–44 B.C. Cicero explains his reasons for writing the dialogue in its opening sentences, saying that he will try to translate Greek philosophy into Latin, now that he has been released from his duties as advocate and senator (I.1).<sup>9</sup> According to Cicero the project is necessary because, although Greece no longer surpasses Rome in customs, morals, or government, to say nothing of war and oratory,

<sup>6</sup> The Archimedes story usually follows the account of Cicero's popularity in Sicily and precedes the anecdote (*Pro Plancio* 64) in which Cicero tells how he learned, on his return from Sicily, that no one in Rome knew or cared where he had been. The following list includes both scholarly and popular biographies: M. Fuhrmann, *Cicero and the Roman Republic*, trans. W.E. Yuill (1990), 37; M. Gelzer, *Cicero: ein biographischer Versuch* (1969), 29, 308–9; C. Habicht, *Cicero the Politician* (1990), 22; H. J. Haskell, *This Was Cicero: Modern Politics in a Roman Toga* (1942), 123–5; W. K. Lacey, *Cicero and the End of the Roman Republic* (1978), 18–19; E. Rawson, *Cicero: A Portrait* (1975), 33–4; E. G. Sihler, *Cicero of Arpinum: A Political and Literary Biography* (1914), 64–5; A. F. Witley, *The Tremulous Hero* (1939), 168–9. On Archimedes, see T. L. Heath, *Archimedes* (1920), 1–5; E. J. Dijksterhuis, *Archimedes* (1987), 9–32.

<sup>7</sup> See especially A. Brinton, 'Cicero's use of historical examples in moral argument', *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 21.3 (1988), 169–84, and T. Habinek, 'Science and tradition in *Aeneid* 6', *HSCP* 92 (1989), 223–55. For a catalogue of Cicero's *exempla*, see M. N. Blincoe, *The Use of the Exemplum in Cicero's Philosophical Works*, Ph.D. dissertation, St Louis University (1941). Oddly enough, Blincoe does not refer to the Archimedes story. On historical *exempla* and their social function, see M. Bloomer, *Valerius Maximus and the Rhetoric of the New Nobility* (1992), esp. 4–10 on Cicero.

<sup>8</sup> A. E. Douglas characterizes them as 'rhetorized'

philosophy rather than philosophical rhetoric. See 'Form and content in the *Tusculan Disputations*', in J. G. F. Powell (ed.), *Cicero the Philosopher* (1995), 197–218. See especially 198–200, with reference to *TD* 1.7. See also P. MacKendrick, *The Philosophical Books of Cicero* (1989), 165. Ann Vasaly puts it well when she concludes that Cicero's reliance on the concrete was 'the Roman gateway to the world of ideas', *Representations: Images of the World in Ciceronian Oratory* (1993), 257. A. D. Leeman, *Orationis Ratio* (1963), 206, also stresses the personal: 'Just as Aristotle had combined his philosophy with rhetorical studies, Cicero wants to add philosophy to his oratory. Of course he could not ignore the age-old feud between rhetoric and philosophy. But ever since his *De Oratore* — as we have seen — he had tried to bring the enemies together. Rhetoric and philosophy are indeed two different things, he makes Crassus argue, but they should be combined in *one and the same person*' (emphasis added).

<sup>9</sup> For a useful list of Cicero's philosophical works, see J. G. F. Powell (ed.), *Cicero the Philosopher* (1995), xiii–xvii. On the preface, see Douglas, *op. cit.* (n. 8), 207–9. For an introduction to Cicero's philosophical works, see A. E. Douglas, 'Cicero the philosopher', in T. A. Dorey (ed.), *Cicero* (1965), 135–70, and J. G. F. Powell's introduction in *Cicero the Philosopher*, 1–35. On Cicero's politics, see C. Habicht, *Cicero the Politician* (1990); N. Wood, *Cicero's Social and Political Thought* (1988).

it still surpasses Rome in theoretical knowledge (*doctrina*, 1.3).<sup>10</sup> Cicero explicitly locates the dialogue within the broad intellectual and historical framework of the ongoing Roman endeavour to appropriate Greek culture and, at the same time, within the narrower autobiographical framework of his political and intellectual career. Indeed the opening remarks both place the dialogue on the threshold marking a point in the continuum extending from a Roman's public service to his private life and commemorate the act of passing over that threshold.<sup>11</sup> We will return to this context later.

The fifth book of the *Tusculan Disputations* argues that virtue is sufficient for living a happy life ('virtutem ad beate vivendum se ipsa esse contentam', 5.1), a climactic argument whose foundations were established in the first four books.<sup>12</sup> Here, after arguing his point by syllogism and recalling discussions that showed the wise man to be happy, Cicero invokes three pairs of contrasting *exempla*.<sup>13</sup> He begins with the Romans Laelius and Cinna; Laelius, whose moral standards were impeccable although he lost a bid for the consulship, and Cinna, who won four consulships but murdered noble men and was killed by his own soldiers (5.55). There follow Catulus, who died at Marius' orders, and Marius, who killed him (5.56). Last of all Cicero introduces a non-Roman *exemplum*, one which receives its counterpart only after extended elaboration: Dionysius the Elder, tyrant of Syracuse (5.57–62).<sup>14</sup> This is the Dionysius who suspended the famous sword over the neck of Damocles in order to convey a sense of the constant fear in which he lived (5.61–2). After telling the story of Dionysius, Damocles, and the sword in some detail, Cicero asks, 'does not Dionysius seem to have made it sufficiently clear (*satisne videtur declarasse Dionysius*) that there can be nothing happy (*beatum*) for the person over whom some fear always looms?' (62). After a brief account of Dionysius' admiration of Phintias and Damon, whose friendship transcended the fear of death, Cicero returns to the tyrant's wretchedness and then tells the story about Archimedes' tomb.

(A) Non ego iam cum huius vita, qua taetrius miserius detestabilius excogitare nihil possum, Platonis aut Archytae vitam comparabo, doctorum hominum et plane sapientium: ex eadem urbe humilem homunculum a pulvere et radio excitabo, qui multis annis post fuit, Archimedes. (B) Cuius ego quaestor ignoratum ab Syracusanis, cum esse omnino negarent, saeptum undique et vestitum vepribus et dumetis indagavi sepulcrum. (C) Tenebam enim quosdam senarios, quos in eius monumento esse inscriptos acceperam, qui declarabant in summo sepulcro sphaeram esse positam cum cylindro. (D) Ego autem cum omnia

<sup>10</sup> Douglas, *op. cit.* (n. 8), 206; T. Habinek, 'Ideology for an empire in the prefaces to Cicero's Dialogues', *Ramus* 23.1–2 (1994), 58–9; idem, *The Politics of Latin Literature: Writing, Identity and Empire in Ancient Rome* (1998), 64–6. Habinek (64) observes, 'Cicero makes it clear that what he is doing is not in fact Hellenizing his own practice, but rather Romanizing Greece'. Habinek points out the metaphors of illumination (*inlustrandum*) and guardianship (*tue mur*) in the opening passage. On the appropriation of Greek learning within Roman cultural norms, see P. Schmidt, 'Cicero's place in Roman philosophy', *CJ* 74 (1978–9), 115–27. Schmidt (119) observes that in addition to imparting philosophical instruction, the literary form of the dialogue continues socio-cultural contacts by way of dedication, and in some cases even served as an obituary notice or *laudatio funebris*.

<sup>11</sup> I use here a metaphor developed by S. Treggiari in 'Home and forum: Cicero between "public" and "private"', *TAPA* 128 (1998), 1–23. Treggiari (3) argues against compartmentalizing Cicero's life and work into the conventional categories of public, private, philosopher, orator, and statesman: 'The individual's experience is a continuum. Let us think of this in relation to physical space, indoors and outdoors. In Roman thinking about the house, public and private join up and overlap. The threshold of the house does not mark a barrier between public and private worlds, but a marker over which household members and non-members pass to go in or out.'

<sup>12</sup> *TD* 5.1: 'Nihil est enim omnium quae in philosophia tractantur quod gravius magnificentiusque dicatur.' Note that in justifying his attempt to make this proof Cicero describes how it can be treated rhetorically. On the topic's position within the dialogue, see Douglas, *op. cit.* (n. 8), 208–9.

<sup>13</sup> Syllogistic argument in 5.15–20; nicely outlined by T. W. Dougan and R. M. Henry (eds), *Cicero's Tusculanae Disputationes* (1905), vol. 2, xxii–xxiii: the man who is under the influence of emotions such as fear is unhappy; men subject to none are happy; this tranquillity is produced by virtue, therefore virtue suffices for living happily. For a more detailed outline of the argument in Book 5, see H. A. K. Hunt, *The Humanism of Cicero* (1954), 116–24.

<sup>14</sup> Cicero uses the same pair at *De Republica* 1.28: 'Quis enim putare vere potest, plus egisse Dionysius tum cum omnia moliendo eriperit civibus suis libertatem, quam eius civem Archimedes cum istam ipsam sphaeram, nihil cum agere videretur, de qua modo dicabatur, effecerit?' Writing of Seneca, R. Mayer observes that two devices helped to impose some control on otherwise shapeless lists of *exempla*: a tendency to group *exempla* into threes, and the rhetorical crescendo, which determines the order of *exempla* within the list: 'Roman historical *exempla* in Seneca', *Entretiens Hardt* 36 (1991), 141–69.

conlustrarem oculis — est enim ad portas Agragentinas magna frequentia sepulcrorum — animum adverti columellam non multum e dumis eminentem, in qua inerat sphaerae figura et cylindri. (E) Atque ego statim Syracusanis — erant autem principes mecum — dixi me illud ipsum arbitrari esse, quod quaererem. (d) inmissi cum falcibus multi purgarunt et aperuerunt locum. quo cum patefactus esset aditus, ad adversam basim accessimus. (c) Apparebat epigramma exesis posterioribus partibus versiculorum dimidiatis fere. (b) Ita nobilissima Graeciae civitas, quondam vero etiam doctissima, sui civis unius acutissimi monumentum ignorasset, nisi ab homine Arpinate didicisset. Sed redeat, unde aberravit oratio: (a) quis est omnium, qui modo cum Musis, id est cum humanitate et cum doctrina, habeat aliquod commercium, qui se non hunc mathematicum malit quam illum tyrannum? Si vitae modum actionemque quaerimus, alterius mens rationibus agitandis exquirendisque alebatur cum oblectatione sollertiae, qui est unus suavissimus pastus animorum, alterius in caede et iniuriis cum et diurno et nocturno metu (*TD* 5.64–5).<sup>15</sup>

Now with the life of this man, than which I can imagine nothing more vile, wretched, and loathsome, I shall not compare the lives of Plato or Archytas, men learned and clearly wise: instead I shall conjure up from his dust and rod a lowly, insignificant man from the same city, who lived many years later, Archimedes. When I was quaestor I tracked down his grave, then unknown to the Syracusans (seeing that they utterly denied its existence), enclosed on all sides, and overgrown with thorn-bushes and thickets. For I remembered some lines of verse, inscribed, as I had heard, upon his memorial, which stated that a sphere together with a cylinder had been set up on the top of his grave.

As for me, after surveying all around (for there is a great throng of graves at the Agrigentine Gate), I noticed a small column standing out a little above the bushes, on which there was the figure of a sphere and a cylinder. And so I immediately said to the Syracusans — their leading men were with me — that I thought it was the very thing which I was seeking. A number of men sent in with sickles cleared the place and, when an approach had been opened, we drew near the pedestal facing us; the epigram was visible, with the verses worn away almost to the middle of the lines. Thus the most famous city of the Greek world, once even the most learned, would have been ignorant of the memorial of its most keen-witted citizen, had it not learned of it from a man of Arpinum.

But let my discourse return to the point from which it has strayed. Who is there who has anything at all to do with the Muses, that is with humanity and learning, who would not prefer to be this mathematician rather than that tyrant? If we look into their manner of life and employment, the mind of the one was nourished by seeking out and pondering theories, accompanied by the delight he gave his own cleverness, which is the sweetest sustenance of souls, that of the other in murder and wrongdoing, accompanied by fear both day and night.

This passage is a rhetorical figure, a *digressio*, set off from the discussion of the happy life by an introduction and return ('non comparabo . . . sed redeat, unde aberravit oratio').<sup>16</sup> Ring-composition reinforces the impression that the story returns at the end to the very place where it left the main argument.<sup>17</sup> The digression departs from the original topic, the happy versus the wretched life (*vita*) (A), but moves on to Archimedes' tomb, with an implied contrast between Cicero's curiosity and knowledge and the Syracusans' ignorance and lack of curiosity: when quaestor in Sicily (*ego quaestor*), Cicero searched out (*indagavi*) Archimedes' tomb, which he says was unknown until then (*ignoratum*) by the Syracusans (B); it moves on to the verses retained in Cicero's memory (C); the discovery of the monument itself (D); Cicero's proclamation of his discovery (E); the approach to the monument (d); then back to the verses (c); the digression ends with Cicero pointing out that the most noble and once most learned of

<sup>15</sup> I follow here the text of Dougan and Henry, *op. cit.* (n. 13).

<sup>16</sup> On *digressio*, see *De Inv.* 1.27; 51; 97; *De Or.* 2.80; 2.311–12; 3.203; *Brutus* 292; 322; C. Davies, 'Reditus ad rem: observations on Cicero's use of *digressio*', *Rheinisches Museum* 131 (1988), 305–15, and H. V. Canter, 'Digressio in the orations of Cicero', *AJP* 52 (1931), 351–61. The *Pro Archia* comes to mind again here since, as Canter (361) points out, the praise of Archias is one long digression beginning at 12: 'Quaeres a nobis cur hoc homine delectemur . . .', and concluding at 32: 'quae a foro aliena iudicialique

consuetudine et de hominis ingenio et communiter de ipsius studio locutus sum, a vobis spero esse in bonam partem accepta.'

<sup>17</sup> MacKendrick, *op. cit.* (n. 8), 25, points out that: 'The form of the Dialogues, as we have seen, is at least some of the time patterned on the traditional parts of a forensic speech. The recessed panel or ring-composition (A-B-C-D-C'-B'-A') ideas patterned around a core, can be detected in the praise of philosophy (*Tusc.* 5.5; see Chapter 12 and n. 42). This is the kind of self-imposed restraint classical art thrives on.'

Greek cities would have been ignorant of the monument of its most ingenious citizen (same verb as in (B) — *ignoratum/ignorasset*), had they not learned of it from him, a man of Arpinum (b); then it returns to the main discussion of the happy versus wretched life ('si vitae modum . . . quaerimus') (a).

The digression, of course, is not necessary to the immediate argument, and indeed, its elimination leaves no gap, since Cicero compares the lives of Dionysius and Archimedes only at (a) after the digression about the tomb.<sup>18</sup> The digression removed, the main argument flows smoothly from the introduction of Archimedes (A) to the happiness of his life of scientific inquiry compared with the misery of Dionysius' paranoia (a):

Ex eadem urbe humilem homunculum a pulvere et radio excitabo, qui multis annis post fuit, Archimedem . . . Quis est omnium, qui modo cum Musis, id est cum humanitate et cum doctrina, habeat aliquod commercium, qui se non hunc mathematicum malit quam illum tyrannum?

I shall summon from his dust and rod a lowly, insignificant man from the same city, who lived many years later, Archimedes . . . Who is there who has anything at all to do with the Muses, that is with humanity and learning, who would not prefer to be this mathematician rather than that tyrant?

We have, then, an anecdote distinct from the main argument, presented as an eyewitness account of an incident by one of the speakers in the dialogue (*ego quaestor . . .*), and centred on the moment of discovery. Yet the digression is embedded in a climactic pair of contrasting *exempla*, and this pair appears in the middle of the climactic argument of a theoretical discussion of ethics ostensibly in the Greek manner (*Graecorum more*, 1.7).<sup>19</sup>

Now Cicero did not need to tell this story about the tomb in order to demonstrate that Archimedes was happier than Dionysius. Indeed it hardly serves that purpose, at least not explicitly, nor does it evoke the readers' assent in the same way the references to Laelius' good character and Catulus' better death do. Cicero might have inserted an anecdote illustrating Archimedes' happy lifelong preoccupation with mathematics, the very idea he takes as given in his rhetorical question 'Who is there who has anything to do with the Muses . . .?' Or he might have shown a vivid image of Archimedes happy at work and oblivious to his own impending death as, indeed, he does at *De Finibus* 5.50: 'quem enim ardorem studii censetis fuisse in Archimede, qui dum in pulvere quaedam describit attentius, ne patriam <quidem> captam esse senserit?' 'For what love of learning do you think was in Archimedes who, while he concentrated on his diagrams in the dust, did not even perceive that his fatherland had been captured?' In fact Cicero's declaration that he will rouse Archimedes from his drawing board and pencil might well make a Roman audience recall the other famous instance of a Roman disturbing the mathematician at his work. This was during the sack of Syracuse, in the middle of the Second Punic War. Archimedes, as the story went, was so intent on studying his geometrical figures that he ordered a Roman soldier to leave them alone and was killed for it.<sup>20</sup> Indeed, the contrast with Dionysius appears to be leading precisely to this point until Cicero deflects the course of the digression to his discovery of the tomb: fear of death made Dionysius wretched, and by suspending the sword over Damocles' head he communicated clearly (*declarare*) how it was impossible for a tyrant to enjoy pleasure. The antithesis is neat and clear: Dionysius, tyrant, fearing for his life; Archimedes, humble private citizen, oblivious to the danger; the two men united by the symbol of

<sup>18</sup> A 'pleasing, but completely irrelevant, anecdote': Cicero: *Tusculan Disputations* 2–5, ed. A. E. Douglas (1990), note to 5.64. The apparent irrelevance which marks this passage as a digression helps it fulfill its rhetorical function.

<sup>19</sup> On the structure of the argument, see Douglas, *op. cit.* (n. 8), 197–204.

<sup>20</sup> Plutarch, *Marcellus* 19.

impending death, the metaphorical sword hanging over every hated tyrant's head and the very real weapon suspended over that of the unconcerned Archimedes.<sup>21</sup>

Archimedes' death was a sore point for the Romans — their commander Marcellus is said to have been both angered and aggrieved (*permoleste tulisse*, Cicero, *In Verrem* 2.4.131) — so there is that negative reason for diverting the discussion from the killing.<sup>22</sup> But we need not speculate too much about what Cicero did not say, for the internal logic of the *Tusculan Disputations* presents compelling reasons why the speaker in the dialogue should place Archimedes and his death in the background and bring his own image into the fore.

## II. THE RHETORIC OF THE ANECDOTE

Even the most casual reader of the *Tusculan Disputations* will observe that Archimedes is not the central figure in this story. After Cicero says that he will compare Dionysius' life to that of Archimedes, he refers to Archimedes only by pronouns in the genitive, as the unnamed possessor of a tomb: 'cuius . . . sepulchrum . . . in eius monumento'. Instead the rhetoric of the passage calls attention to Cicero and his search: Cicero is the subject of the first four main verbs, all of them active (*indagavi*, *tenebam*, *animum adverti*, *dixi*); he is also subject of three subordinate ones (*acceperam*, *conlustrarem*, *quaereram*). The repetition of the emphatic personal pronoun *ego* draws more attention to the aggressively seeking Cicero: 'ego quaestor . . . indagavi sepulchrum . . . ego . . . autem animum adverti columellam . . . ego statim Syracusanis . . . dixi.' In fact Cicero alone is the subject of verbs denoting inquiry until he announces his findings ('Syracusanis . . . dixi'), after which the Syracusans join him as the subject of the verb *accessimus*. Other details reinforce the sense of Cicero's lively and aggressive curiosity: the title *quaestor* offers a weak pun, since it is derived from the verb *quaerere*, 'to search', which describes both Archimedes' life of inquiry ('alterius mens rationibus agitandis exquirendisque alebatur . . .') and Cicero's (*quaereram*, *quaerimus*). In addition, the verb *indagare*, 'to track', introduces a hunting metaphor used elsewhere of philosophical inquiry.<sup>23</sup>

The monument too is active, if less so. The verses on the column are the subject of verbs denoting communication and visibility: 'declarare . . . apparere'. This dual emphasis on Cicero searching and the verses signalling suggests that the anecdote's purpose is less to compare Archimedes and Dionysius than to bring together Cicero and Archimedes' tomb, and thus, indirectly, Cicero and Archimedes, a juxtaposition captured nicely in the word order of the first sentence: 'cuius ego quaestor . . . indagavi sepulchrum'.<sup>24</sup> Cicero, then, joins Alexander and Themistocles in confronting a reminder of the dead, and the language describing the confrontations suggests that this image too represents some kind of comparison and perhaps rivalry. The question then arises whether the parallel is being drawn between Cicero and Archimedes, between Cicero and the tomb commemorating Archimedes, or between Cicero's writing and the tomb. And it is still not clear what is at issue in this comparison and what, precisely, the points of comparison are. The juxtaposition of man and monument becomes even more complex and intriguing when we realize that the anecdote that brings together Cicero and Archimedes also replaces Archimedes with Cicero as the contrast to a miserable tyrant. What is this digression doing? For answers, let us start by turning to the monument itself, as it appears in Cicero's text.

<sup>21</sup> This is how later artists represent Archimedes' death. See, for example, the charcoal by Honoré Daumier in Bruce Laughton, *The Drawings of Daumier and Millet* (1991), 51.

<sup>22</sup> See also Livy 25.31.10; Plutarch, *Marcellus* 19.

<sup>23</sup> In the dialogues Cicero uses *indagare* and the noun *indagatio* for inquiry, and the act of inquiry (*Lucullus* 127; *De Finibus* 5.58; *De Officiis* 1.15). At *TD* 5.5 he

addresses philosophy, 'O virtutis indagatrix expultrixque vitiorum!' See Dougan and Henry, *op. cit.* (n. 13) on *indagatrix*. E. Fantham, *Comparative Studies in Republican Latin Imagery* (1972), 146–7, gives other examples of Cicero's personifications.

<sup>24</sup> On the effect of the word order, see O. Heine and M. Pohlenz (eds), *Ciceronis Tusculanorum Disputationum, Libri V*, vol. 2, (1957), 131.

This is the only description of Archimedes' tomb by someone who claims to have seen it. It is also the most detailed, although Plutarch writes in his *Life of Marcellus* that Archimedes, wanting to commemorate his greatest achievement, asked that a cylinder and a sphere together with the formula for the ratio of their volumes be put on his tomb.<sup>25</sup> Plutarch and the *Tusculan Disputations* agree on the basic points: there was a tomb and above it a figure of a sphere and a cylinder, together with an inscription. The *Tusculan Disputations* describes a column, with the cylinder and sphere on top, resting on an inscribed base.<sup>26</sup> We do not know precisely how the sphere and cylinder appeared on Archimedes' monument, although among the conjectures the most plausible seems to be that it was a three-dimensional stone figure, with part cut in the form of a cylinder and the rest cut away to show the inscribed sphere.<sup>27</sup> In any case, it is likely that the tomb held a three-dimensional sculpture atop the column, as Cicero's anecdote seems to imply, rather than a relief carved into the column itself.

The very fact that there is debate about its appearance ought to remind us that, although Cicero gives a fairly detailed sketch of his own discovery of the tomb, the digression is a rhetorical description offered in the voice of the Cicero who is a participant in this dialogue. This first-person speaker remembers his younger self looking for the tomb; and that younger, remembered, Cicero in turn remembers verses that he heard earlier ('tenebam . . . acceperam'). These several Ciceros, all speaking in the first person, are easily telescoped into one subject. Yet time separates them, tense marks their separation, and memory joins them together. Each Cicero depends for his existence on the memory of the previous one.

Unlike those Syracusan dignitaries, the audience of the *Tusculan Disputations* does not see the monument directly; they see what this narrator chooses to show and do not see the features that he chooses to omit. The digression neither describes how the cylinder and sphere were constructed nor quotes the verses on the column base. Cicero instead refers vaguely to the formula that interprets the sculpture, which itself is described in general terms. Thus the digression, while giving Cicero's audience a view of the discovery of the monument that was lost and found again, permits only limited access to the monument itself. This restriction is deliberate and important. Cicero alone stands behind — or perhaps we should say in front — of this monument; his memory led him to find it; his words preserve it; his *auctoritas* as autobiographical first-person narrator guarantees it to be what he says it is.

And as Cicero represents the grave-marker, it is weakening. The verses at the base of the monument refer to the presence of a cylinder and sphere atop the *columella* above.<sup>28</sup> The monument thus described is a self-sufficient system, with verse interpreting image and image illustrating verse in a perpetual and reciprocal process. The grave-marker draws attention to the ratio of cylinder to sphere, and in doing so draws attention away from the man whom it was built to commemorate. Yet even Archimedes, that inventor of gadgets, could not produce a completely self-sufficient monument, for, when Cicero finds it, the system is beginning to fail: time has eaten away the last half of each of the lines of verse on the base; brush has grown up to obscure the *columella* above. As the monument deteriorates, it loses its ability to commemorate Archimedes and his achievement, since if the verses are worn away, no one can read the epigram, and if the brush grows high enough, no one can see the cylinder and sphere. Cicero's description, moreover, places emphasis on the faintness of the signal emitted by the monument. The verses Cicero once heard are described with diminutives, *senarioli*, *versiculi*; the column,

<sup>25</sup> Plutarch, *Marcellus* 17. The ratio could also be that of their surface areas. Both are 2:3.

<sup>26</sup> E. P. McGowan, 'Tomb marker and turning post: funerary columns in the Archaic period', *AJA* 99.4 (1995), 615–32. According to McGowan, columns are attested as grave markers in the Greek world, including Sicily, as early as the Archaic age. A sculpture on top of such a column might have particular relevance to the life of the person it commemorated: the column

of Diogenes the Cynic, for example, was said to support a sculpture of a dog, a symbol of his philosophical school. Or such a sculpture might simply symbolize death, as does the figure of a siren on the column of Isocrates.

<sup>27</sup> D. L. Simms, 'The trail of Archimedes' tomb', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 53 (1990), 281–6, esp. 283–4.

<sup>28</sup> cf. Plutarch, *Marcellus* 17.

when he finds it, is a small one that barely peeks out above the surrounding brush ('columellam non multum e dumis eminentem').<sup>29</sup>

The monument's deterioration, however, allows Cicero to become a part of the system commemorating Archimedes and, consequently, to forge a set of links between his life story and that of Archimedes which point, as we shall see, to particular moral conclusions. As Cicero says, he found the tomb because he remembered the verses he had heard. He brought to his search prior knowledge of the monument gained through poetry and stored in memory. While the monument itself originally represented the reciprocity of figure illustrating formula and formula interpreting figure, its deterioration now allows Cicero to become part of another reciprocal process. The verses originally seen on the monument and repeated at some point to the younger Cicero remain in his memory; his memory of those verses leads him to rediscover the monument from which those verses came. Moreover, the process that in the objective world begins with the verses on the monument, in the digression begins with Cicero's actions ('tenebam . . . acceperam'). That is, the *remembered* verses help Cicero find what the remains of the *inscribed* verses confirm that he has found. This movement of knowledge from tomb to Cicero's memory and back to the tomb includes Cicero, who is necessary for the process, and the Syracusans, with whom he shares his findings, but excludes Archimedes, who is not. As a first-person narrator Cicero offers a restricted, or focalized, view of himself and the monument, and not a glimpse of Archimedes after the early reference to the *homunculus* engrossed in figures in the sand. Even at the moment of discovery Cicero, as he reports it, says 'I think that this is what I am seeking', rather than, 'I think that this is Archimedes' tomb'. For a story introduced as one about the inquisitive (and by implication happy) life of Archimedes, it is a fine story about the inquisitive (and by implication happy?) life of Cicero, who has usurped Archimedes' role as discoverer ('ego quaestor . . . indagavi').<sup>30</sup>

### III. THE ANECDOTE'S SYMBOLIC AND RHETORICAL FUNCTION

At the simplest level of interpretation we can say that the anecdote about Archimedes' monument commemorates Cicero's discovery of it. Yet in doing so it intertwines the lives of two men, both known for practical and theoretical accomplishments, the Roman statesman and philosopher, and the Greek inventor and mathematician. Let us bring the autobiographical framework back into play: Cicero discovered the monument in 75 B.C., when he was holding the quaestorship, the first rung in the traditional Roman political career. He was married to Terentia and the father of a young daughter. By the time he wrote the *Tusculan Disputations* in 45 B.C., one man, Julius Caesar, was at the head of the state, Caesar had pardoned Cicero for siding with Pompey in the civil war, and Cicero had withdrawn from active political life. The marriage with Terentia had ended and, to make matters worse, Cicero's daughter Tullia had died at his estate in Tusculum, the setting, of course, for this dialogue. Cicero could not bring himself to return to this place for some time after her death.<sup>31</sup> Discouraged about his role in Roman political affairs and grieving for his daughter, Cicero turned to philosophy and produced most of his philosophical works in this year and the next.<sup>32</sup> Thus in

<sup>29</sup> For a *columella* as part of a deliberately understated tomb, see Cicero, *De Leg.* 2.66.

<sup>30</sup> In fact, this is precisely how later artists portrayed the scene. See Simms, op. cit. (n. 27), 281–6, and J. B. Trapp, 'Archimedes' tomb and the artists: a post-script', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 53 (1990), 286–8, with plates.

<sup>31</sup> S. White has drawn attention to the dialogue's setting as that of Cicero's greatest and most recent grief: 'Cicero and the therapists', in Powell, op. cit. (n. 9), 219–46. See also the discussion by A. Erskine: 'Cicero and the expressions of grief', in S. M. Braund

and C. Gill (eds), *The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature* (1997), 36–47. Treggiari, op. cit. (n. 11), discusses the stages of Cicero's grief in detail. On Cicero's withdrawal from active political life, see Habicht, op. cit. (n. 6), 68–86.

<sup>32</sup> These are: *Academica* (45 B.C.); *De Finibus* (45 B.C.); *Tusculan Disputations* (45 B.C.); *De Natura Deorum* (45 B.C.); *De Fato* (44 B.C.); *Cato Maior De Senectute* (44 B.C.); *Laelius De Amicitia* (44 B.C.); *De Officiis* (44 B.C.). On the relative weight of political and autobiographical reasons for Cicero's writing philosophy, see Schmidt, op. cit. (n. 10), 121–3.



recollecting his discovery of the monument, Cicero looks back to the beginning of his political career from the vantage point of thirty years later, a point which he perceives to be its end.<sup>33</sup> The recollected discovery of Archimedes' tomb, then, links Cicero's early political life to his present and allows a return, via memory, to the past, a past now commemorated and reinterpreted by the anecdote as part of his life of inquiry as well as his political life.

The anecdote also contrasts the constant flux of the physical world with the power of human memory, for Cicero's representation of the monument questions its endurance over time. In the years between Archimedes' death and Cicero's quaestorship the last half of each line has been eaten away.<sup>34</sup> Thus in Cicero's reconstruction the tomb becomes a site where the inevitable decay of monuments meets the tenacity of human memory, and both are set against the eternal truth discovered by the mathematician, the ratio of the volumes of cylinder and sphere.<sup>35</sup>

The story of Archimedes' tomb, then, brings together several apparently independent mnemonic processes: the digression moving out of the main argument and returning to the place it began; the monument itself as the text represents it, a self-referential reminder, with figure and formula explicating each other; Cicero's recollection of the beginning of his political career from what appears to be its end, and his incorporation of that beginning into his representation of a life devoted to inquiry; the movement of the verses, which came from the monument and now lead back to it — via Cicero's illuminating memory; the return of *doctrina*, which departed from the Greeks and now returns to a Syracuse that was once the most learned of cities ('quondam . . . doctissima') but is now ignorant of even the reminder of its sharpest citizen, a return that it owes to the tenacious memory of a visiting Roman from a small Italian town ('nisi ab homine Arpinate didicisset'). And behind all these acts of memory associated with Cicero's public life lie his return to philosophy as a consolation and his attempt to rewrite the memory of Tusculum by returning to it as the setting for the dialogue.<sup>36</sup>

For the Syracusan dignitaries accompanying Cicero, a clear path leads to the monument, and the monument points to a lost and greater past, back to Archimedes, the sack of Syracuse, and the time before the city fell into Roman hands; for the audience of the *Tusculan Disputations* the path leads to the digression, which points to Cicero and his discovery. This brings us to the final questions: first, how this written *monumentum* brings together the beginning and end of the *Tusculan Disputations* by joining the arguments that the soul is divine and immortal and that virtue suffices for the happy life; and second, how this neat rhetorical figure, this written monument, works both to help Cicero's audience remember a group of related ideas and to persuade it to act in a particular way.

Memory comes into play early in Book 1, when Cicero uses monuments as material evidence supporting the argument for the immortality of the soul. The soul must be permanent, Cicero says, because everyone is concerned about what will happen after death. Why else, he asks, would people plant trees whose fruit they will not live to eat, why else would great men sow the seed of laws and public policy? 'The very burial monuments (*ipsa sepulcrorum monumenta*), the epitaphs (*elogia*) — what meaning have they except that we are thinking of the future as well as the present?' (1.31). The reference to Archimedes' monument and Cicero's memory would call to mind these

<sup>33</sup> cf. the beginning of the *De Finibus*, which is set in 79 B.C. Cicero regarded his quaestorship in Sicily as a milestone in his development: *Brutus* 318.6: 'cum autem anno post ex Sicilia me recepissem, iam videbatur illud in me, quicquid esset, esse perfectum et habere maturitatem quandam suam.'

<sup>34</sup> On *exedi*, see Dougan and Henry, *op. cit.* (n. 13), at 5.66. Cf. the use of *edax* in Horace, *Odes* 3.30.3, and Ovid, *Met.* 15.234, 872.

<sup>35</sup> Once again this textual monument is particularly appropriate to its context. At the beginning of the *TD* (1.5) Cicero says the Greeks held geometry in the

position of highest honour but that Romans have restricted the art to the purposes of measuring and reckoning: 'in summo apud illos honore geometria fuit, itaque nihil mathematicis illustrius: nos metiendi ratiocinandique utilitate huius artis terminavimus modum.' ('C. denkt etwa an Archimedes', Heine, at 1.5.) The tomb marker, then, serves as a terminus marking the boundary between the two. On the Roman attitude towards mathematics, see E. Rawson, *Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic* (1985), 156–69.

<sup>36</sup> See J. Graff, *Ciceros Selbstauffassung* (1963), 46–54.

earlier references to monuments and memory and their role in lending the *auctoritas* of the past to Cicero's argument.<sup>37</sup>

When Cicero argues for the divinity of the soul, he invokes, in particular, memory and invention to support his point (1.57–61). Cicero first discusses Platonic memory (*anamnesis*, the soul's recollection of its prior knowledge of the forms). Then he says that he finds regular memory even more wonderful — not the artificial technique of the *ars memoriae*, but regular human memory, the kind found in people who have mastered some higher branch of study and art.<sup>38</sup> It is, in fact, precisely this kind of memory, that of the trained orator who recalls arcane literature — in this case the lines of poetry — and uses it to prove a point, that leads Cicero to Archimedes' tomb, and which is set against the fallibility of a decaying monument.<sup>39</sup> For Cicero narrating the story of the tomb, the memory of his own previous lives as student, orator, and statesman replaces the Platonic soul's memory of a previous existence ('recordatio vitae superioris', 1.57). These are obvious points of connection, and at first they may seem to be the only ones, but when we look at how the written monument works rhetorically, we see that there are more, and that they are more complicated.

First, when a writer pairs historical *exempla*, he presents his audience with a moral choice that is essentially a matter of sympathy: 'on which side does one prefer to be?'<sup>40</sup> Cicero could expect an audience of aristocratic and educated Romans to be aware of its own potential future as *exempla* to imitate or to avoid. It would feel sympathy and a sense of rivalry towards the *exemplum* associated with a good 'obituary'. In a pair of contrasting *exempla*, monuments associated with the good example help tilt the argument in his or her favour by giving the person commemorated the authority of having done something worthy of sustained memory.<sup>41</sup> This fits nicely a very Roman way of thinking: men who contribute to the state or to humankind through their *virtus* are commemorated. It is natural to turn this around and infer that the monuments one sees commemorate men sufficiently endowed with *virtus* and concerned about posterity to contribute to society during their lives. Archimedes has left a monument worth finding, thus a memory worth preserving: therefore Archimedes was a citizen endowed with *virtus*. Dionysius, in contrast, has left only a city that has outlived its former glory, anecdotes illustrating his misery, and some bad tragedies (5.63). Virtue, in fact, may not be self-sufficient, at least not for the happy *afterlife*; for a Roman memory is also necessary. It is a compromise: remembered virtue resulting from a permanent contribution to the state or to human knowledge suffices for happiness.<sup>42</sup>

When Cicero redirects attention from Archimedes to himself, he takes Archimedes' place as the positive *exemplum* in contrast to the tyrant Dionysius. Like Archimedes, Cicero is a man of practical and theoretical accomplishment, who contributes to his state through the force of his intellect.<sup>43</sup> It is possible that Cicero sees his defence of the

<sup>37</sup> On Cicero's approach to philosophical questions via history and traditional authority, see also E. Rawson, 'Cicero the historian and Cicero the antiquarian', *JRS* 62 (1972), 33–45, esp. 34–8.

<sup>38</sup> *TD* 1.61–4; 65: 'quae autem divina? vigere, sapere, invenire, meminisse'. See also 1.66, 67, 70. On 1.62–4, see F. Yates, *The Art of Memory* (1966), 44–5. On ancient theories of memory in general, see J. P. Small, *Wax Tablets of the Mind* (1997); Vasaly, *op. cit.* (n. 8), 100–2. On the memory evoked by monuments, see H. H. Davis, 'Epitaphs and the memory', *CQ* 53 (1958), 169–76.

<sup>39</sup> Cicero also uses the memory of a representation to initiate philosophical discussions. At *De Legibus* 1.1, Atticus recognizes the oak that he has read about often in Cicero's epic *Marius*: 'lucus quidem ille et haec Arpinatium quercus agnoscitur saepe a me lectus in Mario'; and at *De Rep.* 6.10, the beginning of the *Somnium Scipionis*, Scipio recognizes the ghost of Africanus by its resemblance to his *imago* — his funerary bust: 'Africanus se ostendit ea forma, quae mihi ex imagine eius quam ex ipso erat notior.'

<sup>40</sup> A. Brinton, 'Cicero's use of historical examples in

moral argument', *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 21.3 (1988), 165–84, discusses how Cicero pairs the man of pleasure, Thorius, with the man of principle, Regulus. Even though we might choose the existence of the former, we cannot help but admit that we would prefer the obituary of the latter' (177–78); or, as Vergil represents it, having done what deserved a noble obituary gave entry to the Fields of the Blessed: *Aeneid*, 6.660–5, on which see Habinek, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 231–8. See also K. Hopkins, *Death and Renewal* (1983), 226–55.

<sup>41</sup> Famous examples include the Scipio epitaphs, *Aeneid* 6.660–5, and the elogia of the Augustan Forum.

<sup>42</sup> Or, perhaps, a paradox. Michèle Lowrie draws my attention to *Pro Archia* 26: 'ipsi illi philosophi etiam illis libellis, quos de contemnenda gloria scribunt, nomen suum inscribunt; in eo ipso, in quo praedicationem nobilitatemque despiciunt, praedicare de se ac nominari volunt.'

<sup>43</sup> As Cicero argues in *De Republica* 1.28, mathematical discovery is as memorable an achievement as holding public office.

Republic by means of all the political contrivances he could muster as analogous to Archimedes' efforts at defending Syracuse with all the mechanical contrivances he could devise, and his withdrawal into philosophy (1.1) as analogous to Archimedes' concentration on his diagrams when all was lost. If Cicero replaces Archimedes, who replaces Dionysius? By this time Cicero considered Caesar a tyrant.<sup>44</sup> Writing to Atticus he had already compared his own use of his wit in an environment controlled by Caesar to Archimedes' ingenuity. One letter complained that he had to deliver a funeral oration for Cato in Caesar's presence, and another said that he had solved the problem. In each case he calls the matter a πρόβλημα Ἀρχιμήδειον.<sup>45</sup> Whether or not Cicero intended his audience to see Caesar in Dionysius, hindsight shows us a clear picture of more swords, not just those hanging over the heads of Damocles and Archimedes, but those hanging over the heads of Caesar, and of Cicero himself. The question is not only which life is happier, Cicero's or Caesar's (and here, Cicero, who has been trying to convince himself all through Book 5 that virtue suffices for happiness, is particularly defiant), but also, which obituary does one want?<sup>46</sup> The answer seems to be that of the defender of his state who, when all is lost, turns his thoughts to his figures in the sand.

Second, what kind of legacy ensures a caring heir? Archimedes was a private citizen and, Cicero claims, obscure (*humilis*); the physical traces of his memory were slight ('senarioli; versiculi; columellam non multum e dumis eminentem'); yet Cicero sought and found his tomb, ensuring the continuity of his memory. The young quaestor ensured, and the mature ex-consul continues to ensure, commemoration for the dead Greek mathematician.<sup>47</sup> In remembering Archimedes he pronounces him the most acute (*acutissimus*) citizen of the noblest and once most learned (*doctissima*) city, as if he were delivering a funeral oration, a kind of speech that 'tends to celebrate accomplishments in terms of superiority over other members of society'.<sup>48</sup> But it is not just the dead who are described in superlatives. The same goes for heirs.<sup>49</sup> The Syracusans' ignorance about the location of Archimedes' tomb, and their active denial of its very existence ('cum esse omnino negarent') cast them as unworthy stewards of their inheritance. It was, after all, the heir's responsibility to see to the upkeep of the tomb. In commemorating the dead, in taking care of the tomb, Cicero takes on the role of the dead man's true heir, the person who, as Cicero says elsewhere, comes closest to replacing the one who has died.<sup>50</sup>

Finally, Cicero rouses Archimedes just as he conjures up Philosophia (*excito*) at 1.5 and 5.64; he brings light (*inlustranda; conlustrarem*) to both.<sup>51</sup>

Philosophia iacuit usque ad hanc aetatem nec ullum habuit lumen litterarum Latinarum; quae inlustranda et excitanda nobis est, ut si occupati profuimus aliquid civibus nostris, prosimus etiam, si possumus otiosi.

Philosophy has lain neglected up to this time, nor has Latin Literature shed any light on it. We must illuminate and revive it, so that, if I have done any good to my countrymen when officially at work, I do so, if I can, when at leisure as well.

Not only does Cicero cast himself as Archimedes' heir, but by overlapping the imagery used to describe the resurrection of philosophical inquiry, the invocation of Archimedes

<sup>44</sup> On Caesar as tyrant, see Wood, op. cit. (n. 9), 156-7.

<sup>45</sup> Cicero, *Ad Att.* 12.15; 13.28. See D. L. Simms, 'A problem for Archimedes', *Technology and Culture* 30.1 (1989), 177-8. On Archimedes' defence of Syracuse, see Polybius 8.6; Livy 24.34.1-16; Plutarch, Marcellus 19.

<sup>46</sup> Douglas, op. cit. (n. 8), 210-12.

<sup>47</sup> Not only here, but also when he talks about the Greek esteem for mathematics in *TD* 1.5, and *De Rep.* 1.28.

<sup>48</sup> Habinek, op. cit. (n. 7), 237.

<sup>49</sup> E. Champlin, *Final Judgments* (1991), 9 n.16.

<sup>50</sup> See *De Legibus* 2.48, on the laws concerning the person responsible for performing the rites for the

dead: 'heredum causa iustissima est; nulla est enim persona, quae ad vicem eius, qui e vita emigraret, propius accedat'; on the heir's responsibility and the concern for the upkeep of the tomb, see Champlin, op. cit. (n. 49), 169-82.

<sup>51</sup> On *inlustrare*, see Habinek, op. cit. (n. 10, 1998), 64-5. Cf. Livy, Preface, 10. My thanks to Tom Habinek and one of *JRS*'s readers for pointing out that, by using the verb *excito*, Cicero is rousing the dead as well as calling Archimedes from his studies. On conjuring the dead see B. J. Dufallo, *Ciceronian Oratory and the Ghosts of the Past*, diss. Los Angeles (1999). See also Horace, *Odes* 1.28.1-3 and Nisbet and Hubbard's extensive comments ad loc.

as an *exemplum*, and the discovery of Archimedes' tomb, he shows his own method of inquiry — one focused on ethics, relying ultimately on personal authority and the authority of the past rather than argument — as the heir and replacement of Greek theoretical inquiry.<sup>52</sup> Other elements of the story lend themselves to an allegorical interpretation. With the Roman quaestor as their guide, the Syracusans leave their intellectually obsolete city to find their noble past outside its gates.<sup>53</sup> Cicero surveyed the field (*conlustrarem*) and approached the grave through the way cleared of brambles (might those 'inmissi cum falcibus multi' represent previous philosophers?). There is no detailed description of the monument or quotation of the verse, no exclamation of 'eureka!', only the report of the report: 'ego . . . dixi me illud ipsum arbitrari esse, quod quaererem'. One cannot approach the truth directly; one must fall back on the elements of rhetoric: digression, *exempla*, the *auctoritas* of the quaestor.<sup>54</sup>

The story of Archimedes' tomb, then, leads the reader toward the life of inquiry, a way of life that is now as Roman as it is Greek, thanks to Cicero's philosophical works, and one that is now as legitimate a pastime for a Roman as political service, thanks to Cicero's example of himself using his stint as public servant to satisfy his own curiosity.<sup>55</sup> It conveys its point by transmitting pleasure — Cicero's pleasure in inquiry, and his pleasure in remembering his past life. The point of a digression is to please, *delectare*.<sup>56</sup> The very idea of a pleasure-causing rhetorical figure arises nicely from the context: Dionysius suspended a sword over the head of Damocles to convey vividly through a shared experience how fear of impending death could completely block the sensation of pleasure (recall his words: "So then, Damocles", he said, "since this life pleases (*delectat*) you, do you want to taste my fortune and experience it directly?" 5.62). Rather than portraying a scene that showed Archimedes happy and oblivious to the fear of death, Cicero conveys to his audience a sense of his own pleasure in inquiry through the intellectual pleasure of the digression. The anecdote achieves what the sword did in another way as well: the sword of Damocles blocks any thought of pleasure, even for a man sitting at a loaded table; the anecdote blocks any thought of death, even while describing a monument that is a reminder of a man's mortality.<sup>57</sup>

Cicero uses his past self as an *exemplum* for which he can vouch with complete authority. Returning to philosophy as a consolation, he remembers his past intellectual pleasure.<sup>58</sup> The sword hanging over Dionysius, Damocles, Archimedes, Caesar, and Cicero alike is replaced by the happiness common to all who live the life of inquiry. On

<sup>52</sup> See, for example, *TD* 1.13, where Cicero invokes the tombs of the Metelli and the Scipiones to argue that the dead cannot be wretched.

<sup>53</sup> On a similar but more extended use of topography in philosophical dialogue, see C. Osborne, 'Eros, the Socratic spirit: inside and outside the *Symposium*', *Eros Unveiled* (1994), 86–116, esp. 86–100.

<sup>54</sup> Canter, op. cit. (n. 16), 351 n. 1, points out that one of the uses of digression identified by Cicero was to weaken or bury out of sight proofs upon which the prosecution relies (*Part. Orat.* 5.15). A. Michel, 'Rhétorique et philosophie dans les *Tusculanes*', *REL* 39 (1961), 158–75, esp. 164–5, observes the blend of philosophical and traditional Roman authority: 'L'immortalité de l'âme, dont il s'agit ici, n'est point incontestable, mais on peut y croire, et s'appuyer alors sur l'autorité de Platon. Lorsque Cicéron voudra serrer de plus près la vérité, il cherchera une opinion sur laquelle s'accordent non seulement les amis de Platon mais aussi ses adversaires. Il dira que la mort n'est point du mal. Cela, les Stoïciens l'ont admis tout en niant l'immortalité; les anciens Romains, sans se soucier de philosophie, ont montré eux aussi à la guerre leur indifférence à de pareilles craintes. Ici donc, Cicéron peut faire converger tout les formes de probabilité: autorité des philosophes, raisonnements des dialecticiens, tradition populaire de *mos maiorum*.'

<sup>55</sup> See *De Nature Deorum* 1.6: 'Nos autem nec subito coepimus philosophari nec mediocrem a primo tempore aetatis in eo studio operam curamque con-

sumpsimus, et cum minime videbamus tum maxime philosophabamur.' While at *TD* 1.1 Cicero says that he is returning to philosophy, the topic has been in his mind always: '... rettuli me, Brute, te hortante maxime ad ea studia, quae retenta animo, remissa temporibus, longo intervallo intermissa revocavi ...'

<sup>56</sup> When Cicero lists digression among rhetorical figures in *De Orat.* 3.203, he points out that its job is to please and then to return smoothly to the main topic at hand: 'et ab re digressio, in qua cum fuerit delectatio, tum reditus ad rem aptus et concinnus esse debet.'

<sup>57</sup> Cicero's letters to Atticus about Tullia's shrine show that earlier in the year he had been very interested in memorials and the problems associated with them. See *Att.* 12.18, 19, 36. On tombs as reminders of the dead and of mortality, see *TD* 1.31; *De Senectute* 21 (Cato speaking, on old men's memories): 'Nec sepulcra legens vereor, quod aiunt, ne memoriam perdam; his enim ipsis legendis in memoriam redeo mortuorum'; as reminders of the dead and of mortality, see also Varro, *De Lingua Latina* 6.49.

<sup>58</sup> On the return to philosophy as a refuge rather than a pleasure, *delectatio*, see, for example, *Fam.* 6.12.5, 9.2.5, 13.28.2; for additional passages, see Graff, op. cit. (n. 36), 133. n. 23; Cicero also enjoys one of the fruits of old age, remembering past achievements: *De Senectute* 71 (Cato speaking): 'Fructus autem senectutis est, ut saepe dixi, ante partorum bonorum memoria et copia.'

the one hand, the technical arguments of the *Tusculan Disputations* aim to prove that the soul is immortal, that virtue suffices for happiness; on the other, the anecdote about the monument exhorts the reader to a virtuous (and by implication happy) life of inquiry by presenting not just Archimedes as an *exemplum*, but Archimedes and Cicero together.<sup>59</sup> In the continuous competition between the past and the present, the places associated with famous men urge the viewer to emulate them.<sup>60</sup> The person commemorated by the monument sets the standard, and the monument presents the challenge. By including the anecdote in the final book of the *Tusculan Disputations* Cicero shows that he has already successfully met this challenge, which his representation of the tomb reshapes and passes on to his audience.

Reconstructed by Cicero, Archimedes' tomb draws the reader toward the life of inquiry, just as the *figura* of cylinder and sphere standing out from the brush both illustrates the verses in a concrete way and beckons the person who is willing to search for truth that is not readily apparent. The rediscovery of the monument emerges as a symbolic point of intersection for the Greek and the Roman, for rhetoric and *doctrina*, for two ways of achieving the same thing: drawing a person away from obsession with the accidents of fortune in the sub-lunary world. At the same time, the monument holds the Greek and Roman worlds apart. The Greek life of inquiry belongs to the past; the Roman to the present and the future. The image of Cicero at Archimedes' tomb is Cicero's monument to his life of service and philosophy; and, like other *monumenta*, it both reminds and exhorts. As Cicero, our exemplary Roman, represents it, the invitation to the life of inquiry is personal and specific: looking at Cicero's written monument one wonders at human memory, and by considering the movements of memory comes to contemplate those of the celestial spheres.

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<sup>59</sup> The anecdote fits into a particularly Roman view of argumentation, in which 'both a technical argument and an exhortation are appropriate for consideration of moral matters' (Habinek, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 247–8). Habinek need not have excepted the *TD* from the philosophical works in which he observes this phenomenon. Although employing a mode of discourse

that is untraditional from a Roman point of view, Cicero emphasizes memory and example in a way that is very Roman. See also M. Beard, 'Cicero and divination; the formation of a Latin discourse', *JRS* 76 (1986), 33–46.

<sup>60</sup> See the extended development of this idea in the contemporary *De Finibus* 5.1–8.